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23 January 1963




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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

State Department review  
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
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
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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

\*Common Market--Britain: [The] To date, the Adenauer - De Gaulle talks do not appear to have materially changed the outlook for Britain's Common Market membership.]

[A] proposal attributed to Adenauer would further delay any formal rupture in the ministerial talks by temporarily suspending them while the EEC's executive commission drafts a list of outstanding issues and proposed solutions. However, such an exercise would focus on the technical obstacles--rather than De Gaulle's political objections--to Britain's membership, and there would be no guarantee that the talks would soon resume. Moreover, the proposal may be intended primarily to ease Adenauer's problems in obtaining parliamentary approval of his bilateral political accord with De Gaulle.]

[The "other five" are trying to maintain their front against the French and may attempt to continue the talks with Britain with an "empty chair" for France. The French are also being given regular warnings of possible retaliation. The Dutch, for example, have let it be known that there are a large number of EEC decisions of interest to the French which still require unanimous approval.]

[The Macmillan government is sticking to its public stance that it will accept nothing less than full membership, and its massive efforts to shore up its.]

Support within the EEC are still directed toward that end. There is some evidence that London has not categorically ruled out association as an alternative to full membership. According to documents made available by the British to the US Government, the British ambassador in Paris told Couve that he doubted London would embark on another 14 months of talks only to find out that France is opposed to association also.]

[The British are increasingly of the opinion that there is a close connection between De Gaulle's attitude on the accession question and his reaction to the Nassau agreements. In reporting his conversation with Couve, the British ambassador at Paris stated that Couve had agreed that the proposals for a NATO multilateral nuclear force had a "lot to do" with De Gaulle's objections. No response from Couve was reported, however, to the ambassador's suggestion that nothing in the Nassau agreement prevented the development of a European defense policy and the emergence of Europe as an equal partner of the US.]

[In commenting on the situation, the British ambassador hazarded the guess that De Gaulle is really engaged in a broad maneuver to exclude the US from Europe preparatory to some kind of overture to the Soviet Union. On 20 January he reported to London that De Gaulle might suggest to Adenauer that, in view of Chinese pressure on the USSR, it would be possible to make a deal under which Germany could be reunified and France and Germany could live in friendly relations, if not in alliance, with Russia. The ambassador says he made the same point to West Germany's ambassador to NATO. He went so far as to suggest that De Gaulle's vision]

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of a Europe united from the Atlantic to the Urals  
might not be just an empty phrase for the distant  
future and that he might even be aiming at a "re-  
versal of alliances")


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
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Cuba: The fifth SAM installation in Cuba to be relocated has been moved 11 nautical miles from Chaparra on the north coast of Oriente Province to a site near Holguin Airfield.



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Two previous shifts of SAM units in Cuba were apparently made to afford greater protection to the important areas of Santiago de Cuba and Camaguey Airfield. Further redeployment of Cuba's 24 SAM sites could occur as experience with local conditions and the requirements of the air defense system warrant.

Photography [redacted] also revealed that cruise-missile equipment has been delivered to a site near Guerra, on the north coast of Pinar del Rio Province several miles west of Mariel. This is the first sighting of cruise-missile equipment here since aerial photography [redacted] first disclosed that a coastal-defense cruise-missile launch site might be under construction. Completion of the installation would bring to four the number of operational cruise-missile sites identified in Cuba.

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The equipment seen at the Guerra site [redacted] [redacted] may represent a part of the shipment unloaded from the Soviet vessel Simferopol in Havana

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East Germany: Changes announced on 22 January in the composition of East Germany's top leadership, like the speeches at the recently concluded party congress, suggest that the regime intends to deal more realistically than heretofore with its domestic problems.

Three of the ablest candidate members have been promoted to full membership in the politburo, thus enlarging it from 11 to 14. None of the three is identified with "dogmatic" tendencies. At least two--Paul Froehlich and Paul Verner, party leaders in the important Leipzig and East Berlin districts, respectively--appear to have the requisite qualities for the top party position, as does the re-elected Erich Honecker, who long has been Ulbricht's right-hand man. As these men assume more prominent roles in the party, Ulbricht's authority might gradually be reduced.

The politburo's candidate membership has been radically overhauled with five dropped and seven added. These changes reflect the party's intention to use technically trained men to deal with pressing problems in agriculture and industry and to effect ideological and cultural policies designed to give the regime a more attractive appearance. No significant concessions to the population's hopes for an improvement of its condition seem indicated.

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South Korea: [A split developing in the junta threatens political stability during the current transition to a facade of representative government.]

[Major General Kim Tong-ha, a leader of the senior officers in the ruling Supreme Council, has resigned in protest against moves of junta strong-man Kim Chong-pil to dominate the political party the government is organizing. Other council members are reported ready to resign in the belief that early action is required to break Kim Chong-pil's power.]

[Since many of Kim Chong-pil's opponents have ties with service units, a split in the junta could lead to the use of military forces in a struggle for power.]

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
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NOTES

India: [Nehru's qualified acceptance of the Colombo proposals for stabilizing the present ceasefire with Communist China has evoked strong criticism in his own party and other non-Communist

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Jordan: A severe drought is adding to the problems of King Husayn's regime, at a time when it already faces widespread political unrest. All of Jordan's livestock are imperiled and a wheat shortage has sharply increased food prices. The drought especially hits the bedouin, who are the bulwark of the regime.

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\*Peru: The ruling military junta seems to be moving closer to a decision to outlaw the leftist, anti-Communist APRA, whose near victory in last year's presidential elections precipitated the military takeover.

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Outlawing APRA would prevent its participation in the June elections, either independently or as a member of a coalition, and could precipitate an attempt to oust the junta.

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